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Recalling information from a particular category can reduce one’s memory capability
for related, non-retrieved information. This is known as the retrieval-induced forgetting
effect (RIF; Anderson et al., 1994). The present paper reviews studies that show that the
RIF effect is motivated. More specifically, we describe research showing that the need
for closure (NFC; the motivation to attain epistemic certainty; Kruglanski and Webster,
1996) generally enhances the RIF, because this prevents uncertainty and confusion
from the intrusion of unwanted memories during selective-retrieval. However, when the
content of the to-be-forgotten information serves the retriever’s goals, NFC reduces RIF.
Overall, the present findings are consistent with the view that motivation can affect the
magnitude of RIF effects which, in turn, can serve as a mechanism for reaching preferred
conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
A few days ago, the first author was trying to remember a name of a charismatic woman he had met
at a party several months ago. After a couple of minutes, he finally managed to remember her name.
After that, he also wanted to remember the names of the other people he’d met on that occasion.
However, this latter task proved so difficult that he had to give up. It seemed that the name of the
charismatic woman kept intruding into his mind whenever he tried to think of the other people’s
names, thus making recalling them more difficult.
The episode above is one example of how memory may be affected by the process of selective-
retrieval. More specifically, recalling information (e.g., a name of a charismatic woman) from a
particular category (e.g., people at a party) can reduce one’s memory capability for related, non-
retrieved information (e.g., the names of other party guests). This effect is known as retrieval-
induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson, 2003). Globally, the RIF phenomenon has
essentially been explained as an automatic cognitive effect (due to inhibition or interference; see
Anderson et al., 1994) induced by partial recall. We propose that the retrieval process (and its effects
on forgetting) is not solely cognitive; rather, it is also affected by motivational factors. We further
postulate that one motivational factor at heart of the RIF phenomenon is the need for closure (NFC;
Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). In the current mini-review, we present studies relevant to these
suggestions, thus demonstrating that reconstructive memory is governed by the same mechanisms
that underlie all motivated judgments (Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2012).
The RIF effect has been studied using the retrieval-practice paradigm, in which participants
memorize a set of category-exemplar pairs (usually eight categories with six items each: e.g.,
“Fruit-Apple”; “Fruit-Orange”; “Color-White”; Anderson et al., 1994). After the initial study-phase,
subjects retrieve half of the items of half of the categories (usually three items of a subset of four
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categories). Selective retrieval-practice is accomplished using
cued stem tests (e.g., “Fruit-Ap___”). After a 20-min distractor
task, participants are asked to recall all the exemplars of all
the categories originally studied. The RIF effect refers to the
reduced recall of retrieval non-practiced items (Rp− items;
e.g., “Fruit-Orange”) as opposed to non-retrieval practice items
from unpracticed categories (Nrp items; e.g., “Color-White”)
(RIF = Nrp > Rp−). The RIF is a pervasive phenomenon that
occurs in a variety of contexts and with a wide assortment
of stimuli, ranging from eyewitness testimony to language
acquisition (for a review, see Storm et al., 2015).
According to the present motivational perspective, the RIF
effect is a fundamentally adaptive mechanism: it protects the
recall of desired and/or useful memories from the interference of
undesired and/or useless ones (Storm, 2011). More specifically,
the intrusion of interfering items during recall may undermine
selective-retrieval, fostering epistemic uncertainty and confusion.
People are generally motivated to avoid such confusion during
retrieval; as a result, they engage in RIF. One intriguing
implication of this analysis is that motivational variables that
lead one to have a stronger-than-usual dislike for uncertainty
can influence the strength and direction of RIF effects. One such
variable is the NFC, described in more detail below.
Need for closure is defined as a “desire for a firm answer to
a question, any firm answer, as compared to confusion and/or
ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 2004, p. 6). More specifically, NFC
is a motivational tendency that leads individuals to seek out
clarity, structure, and certainty. As a result of this, individuals
who are high on NFC have a strong preference for quick and
firm decisions, experience discomfort with ambiguity, and desire
stable knowledge that does not change across situations. They
are closed-minded and reluctant to accept information that is
in conflict with their already-formed opinions. In accordance
with this, previous work on NFC has shown that this motivation
leads individuals to focus on schema-confirming information
and avoid disconfirming information (Dijksterhuis et al., 1996;
Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000; Strojny et al., 2016). It also
enhances goal shielding (i.e., when an individual protects his or
her focal goal by inhibiting alternative goals; Shah et al., 2002) and
increases the efficiency with which individuals handle irrelevant
information (Kossowska, 2007).
High NFC individuals are particularly motivated to ignore
irrelevant information, because such information can prevent
them from attaining clear-cut knowledge. The intrusion of
interfering items into the mind during selective retrieval in the
RIF paradigm is one case in which irrelevant information (Rp−
items) can foster uncertainty as to which focal memories (Rp+
items) should be retrieved at any given moment. Since high NFC
individuals have a strong aversion to any type of uncertainty or
confusion, they should thus increase their focus on the class of
items to be recalled (Rp+ items) while doing their best to forget
irrelevant competing items (Rp− items) that could interfere with
the retrieval process. In other words, NFC should generally lead
to an enhanced RIF effect (Hypothesis 1).
However, when the content of the information to be forgotten
(Rp− items) is relevant to retrievers’ goals, high NFC individuals
should be more likely to keep this information in mind. This
occurs because high NFC individuals are motivated to avoid an
unpleasant inconsistency between their current desires and the
informational content in their mind (Kruglanski and Shteynberg,
2012). Thus, we hypothesize that when the content of the to-
be-forgotten information (Rp− items) is manipulated (i.e., to
be consistent or inconsistent with retriever’s goals), NFC should
enhance the RIF only when the to-be-forgotten information
does not serve the retriever’s goals. When the to-be-forgotten
information serves goals, NFC should reduce the RIF effect
(Hypothesis 2).
Lastly, work on the role of cognitive resources within goal
pursuit has shown that every cognitive process requires a
combination of resources and motivation in order to be enacted
(Kruglanski et al., 2012). This combination of resources and
motivation plays an especially important role when cognitive
activity is difficult (vs. easy) to carry out: when a task is easy,
anyone can do it, and thus relatively little motivation and/or
resources are necessary. However, when a task is difficult, high
motivation and/or high resources are required in order to
complete it successfully (Kruglanski et al., 2012). Thus, we further
expected that Hypothesis 1 should be moderated by participants’
available cognitive resources: individuals with high NFC (i.e.,
those who are motivated to engage in RIF) should be the most
effective at RIF when they also have ample cognitive resources
(Hypothesis 3). Evidence for each of these three hypotheses is
reviewed in the following section.
EVIDENCE FOR RIF AS MOTIVATED
COGNITION
Recent research has demonstrated that the RIF is influenced by
NFC, thus providing support for Hypothesis 1. In three studies,
Pica et al. (2014) found strong NFC effects on RIF in a Retrieval-
Practice Paradigm using eyewitness scenarios. More specifically,
in the first two studies, participants read a narrative about a
robbery and then viewed ten characteristics (e.g., age, build,
haircut, and face shape) ascribed to each of the two protagonists
of the robbery (one blond and one dark-haired), for a total of 20
items. To induce the RIF effect, half of the participants practiced
with half of the blond-haired offender’s characteristics and the
second half practiced with half of the dark-haired offender’s
characteristics. The results showed that high NFC participants
displayed a higher RIF effect, both when assessing memory with a
free-recall-task (Study 1) or with a more controlled memory task
(i.e., using the first two letters to control for output interference;
Study 2). Study 3 replicated this effect while varying the witness
scenario: participants read two narratives about two burglaries in
two houses where ten items (e.g., a television) were stolen from
each house. The results of this study again showed that high NFC
participants exhibited a higher RIF effect (Hypothesis 1).
Although the foregoing studies showed that the RIF effect
is influenced by motivational variables, and by the NFC in
particular, they did not show that motivation can be sensitive to
the content of what is forgotten. Consistent with our Hypothesis
2, other research has found that motivation can reduce or
enhance the RIF effect to the extent that the Rp− items serve
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the retriever’s goals (or do not serve them). For instance,
Pica et al. (2016) found that self-threat, a condition known
to enhance prejudicial responses (Fein and Spencer, 1997),
biased individuals’ memory of homosexual targets. In particular,
participants under self-threat (which was induced by fake
negative feedback on an IQ test) enhanced the RIF of positive
items ascribed to a homosexual target, and reduced the RIF of
negative items ascribed to the same person. Standard RIF effects
were observed for both positive and negative stimuli ascribed to
a heterosexual target. Importantly, the results in the self-threat
condition were conceptually replicated with another stigmatized
target, i.e., African American target (see Pica et al., 2017).
These results suggest that when people are motivated to arrive
at a particular conclusion, they tend to construct a coherent
justification for that conclusion by (1) avoiding disconfirming
information; and (2) activating information that is consistent
with their goals and that is useful for reaching desired conclusions
(Santioso et al., 1990; Kruglanski, 1996; Bélanger et al., 2014).
According to our Hypothesis 2, the effect described above
should be strengthened by individuals’ NFC. In line with this
reasoning, recent research has shown that high NFC individuals
are affected by gender-role-stereotypes when remembering
characteristics of female managers (Pica et al., 2018). In two
studies, high NFC individuals enhanced the RIF effect of
masculine dimensions (e.g., powerful and agency) ascribed to
a female manager and reduced the RIF effect of feminine
dimensions (e.g., warmth and communal) ascribed to the
same target. Furthermore, as expected, the recall of feminine
dimensions as ascribed to the female manager were less impaired
by high NFC participants, as compared to the recall performance
of the same dimensions when ascribed to the male manager;
and the recall of masculine dimensions ascribed to the female
manager were more strongly impaired than when ascribed to
the male manager. The present findings suggest that when faced
with women leaders, high NFC individuals are motivated to
search for gender stereotype-congruent memories, thus reducing
the RIF of such memories. More broadly, these results indicate
that NFC focuses the attention of the retriever on memories
that are consistent with their prior stereotypical knowledge,
by enhancing the association between stereotypical memories
(communal and feminine dimensions for the female manager
and agency and masculine dimensions for the male manager)
and the target, and reducing the association between counter-
stereotypical memories and the same target.
Finally, research has also shown that the relationship between
NFC and RIF is moderated by energy availability (Hypothesis 3).
In two experiments, Pica et al. (2013a) found that when forgetting
interfering items was difficult (i.e., participants had only a small
amount of practice with the focal items), and participants had
adequate cognitive resources, RIF was positively affected by
participants’ NFC. In Study 1, participants’ NFC and circadian
rhythm was measured. One week later, they came back to
the lab to perform a memory experiment either at times that
matched their circadian rhythm (e.g., morning people in the
morning) or at times that did not (e.g., morning people in the
evening). During this second session, participants completed
the RIF paradigm utilizing neutral stimuli. In this experiment,
all participants were placed in a condition where forgetting
interfering items was difficult (participants had a small amount
of practice with the focal items). The results revealed that
high NFC participants with high energy (e.g., those who came
in at times of testing that matched their circadian rhythm)
exhibited a greater RIF effect. In Study 2, the authors added
a condition where forgetting interfering items was easy (i.e.,
participants had a large amount of practice with the focal items).
Participants’ scores on the Automated Operation Span Task
(OSPAN; Conway et al., 2005) were used as a measure of resource
availability. Then, participants completed the RIF paradigm using
brand names of product categories. In line with the hypotheses,
the findings of Study 2 confirmed that when the amount of
retrieval-practice was high (easy condition) no differences in
the RIF were found; however, when the amount of retrieval-
practice was low (difficult condition), high NFC participants
with a high OSPAN score were those with the highest RIF
effect. These results indicate that, as predicted, the NFC is most
likely to enhance RIF when individuals have adequate cognitive
resources.
TOWARD A MOTIVATIONAL VIEW OF
THE RIF: RE-INTERPRETING PRIOR
FINDINGS
As can be seen above, multiple studies have provided direct
support for our notion that the RIF effect is subject to
motivational influence. In addition, our motivational viewpoint
is broadly compatible with previous research on RIF: even prior
studies that did not directly examine the role of motivation in RIF
can be interpreted as fitting the motivational perspective. In this
section, we describe such previous findings and explain how they
can be viewed through a motivational lens.
Garcia-Bajos and Migueles (2009) demonstrated that
stereotype activation prevented RIF for highly stereotypical
traits (e.g., Athlete–Competitive, when participants selectively
practiced low-typicality traits). On the contrary, RIF was
normally found for low-typicality (Athlete–Risky) or control
traits (i.e., a stereotyped trait associated to a person’s name; e.g.,
Mikel–Competitive). Consistent with the above findings, Dunn
and Spellman (2003) found that stereotypical belief (i.e., the
extent to which people believe in the stereotype) impaired the
later recall of (i.e., RIF for) stereotypical traits ascribed to a target
[e.g., June (Asian-Americans)-Studious], when individuating
traits (ascribed to the same target) were practiced [e.g., June
(Asian-Americans)-Elegant]. The foregoing findings have
previously been explained in terms of the cognitive mechanism
of integration between the items. Specifically, the argument was
that the stereotype promotes the creation of strong linkages
among the stereotypical traits, which then circumvent the RIF
effect. However, these same findings can be explained as an
effect of motivation: individuals are motivated to uphold their
stereotypical beliefs, thus reducing the RIF for information
consistent with those beliefs.
Moreover, Storm and Jobe (2012) found a positive relationship
between levels of RIF and a tendency to recall significantly
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fewer negative events on an autobiographical memory task.
In explaining these findings, the authors argued that people
with a greater inhibitory ability are more likely to inhibit
(enhanced RIF) negative autobiographical memories. However,
a motivational bias toward remembering positive features about
the self, thus maintaining one’s positive self-image and positive
affect, could also cause individuals to forget negative events.
Consistently, a recent study (Nuney et al., 2017) demonstrated
that people high in state anxiety show the highest RIF for
threatening categories, thereby protecting the self.
Furthermore, Coman and Hirst (2015) found that socially
shared RIF (i.e., RIF induced by a speaker to a listener) is
higher when the speaker and the listener belong to the same
group (ingroup) rather than a different group (outgroup), thereby
showing that this effect is contingent to a motivational tendency
to promote the emergence of shared mnemonic representations
that preserve group identity.
Amir et al. (2001) found that people with generalized social
phobia did not show RIF for negative social words. Similarly,
Kuhbandner et al. (2009) showed that the RIF of negative stimuli
decreased as a function of the participants’ dispositional negative
affectivity. The authors proposed item-specific processing, which
is known to eliminate the RIF, as an explanation of this effect.
However, an alternative motivational explanation is also possible:
dispositional negative affectivity may drive participants toward
a mood-congruency bias (i.e., the motivation to remember items
congruent with the participants’ affective state), thus reducing the
RIF of negative items.
Thus, in our view, all of the findings described above fit well
with the notion that the RIF effect is motivated. This suggests that,
in line with our hypotheses, motivation is a critical but heretofore
overlooked determinant of the RIF effect.
DISCUSSION
The present work aims to contribute to the RIF literature
by elucidating the motivational dynamics that underlie the
phenomenon. We hypothesized and found that NFC plays a
central role in determining the extent of RIF effects. Specifically,
NFC was expected to lead to greater RIF in order to avoid the
confusion and uncertainty that may stem from the interference of
unwanted items during selective-recall (Hypothesis 1). However,
where the content of items to be forgotten was manipulated,
NFC was expected to lead to higher RIF effect only when the
to-be-forgotten-items do not serve the retriever’s goals. When
the to-be-forgotten-items serve the retriever’s goals, then the
RIF of such memories is reduced (Hypothesis 2). Moreover,
individuals with high NFC should show the greatest RIF effects
when they also have high cognitive resources (Hypothesis 3).
We reviewed data that provided support for all three of these
hypotheses.
One implication of the above reasoning is that over time,
selective-retrieval may serve to affirm and re-affirm previous
knowledge and desired conclusions. This can have important
consequences for intellectual rigidity and arrogance. In fact,
RIF may serve to confirm prior epistemic hypotheses by
enhancing the accessibility of consistent information and
reducing the accessibility of inconsistent information in memory,
therefore reducing the possibility of hypothesis-invalidation.
Pessimistically, this view of the RIF seems to leave no space
for changing one’s prior ideas or invalidating prior epistemic
hypotheses. However, conditions in which RIF may lead to
forget goal-congruent (hypotheses-validating) items must then
be present. A possible moderating factor may be the importance
of focal goals: when it is of low importance a similar RIF effect
with both consistent and inconsistent information is expected.
Furthermore, given that previous work has clearly shown that
the RIF is energy-dependent (e.g., Pica et al., 2013b), and
consistent with the cognitive energetics theory (CET, Kruglanski
et al., 2012), conditions that determine energy depletion should
moderate goal-congruency effects of RIF. For instance, the goal-
congruency effects we described earlier (Hypothesis 2) should
result in greater RIF especially when participants also have energy
(or the task is easy). These matters could be profitably explored in
future research.
Another avenue for future research may be to investigate the
boundary conditions of the effects of motivation on the cognitive
processes that underlie RIF. One hypothesis is that when
memories are neutral with regards to the (specific) motivational
and emotional states of the individual (i.e., directed to confirm
prior epistemic hypotheses), RIF effects are determined by
cognitive processes only (e.g., inhibition and interference),
and/or by an interaction between cognitive processes and non-
specific motivations such as non-specific NFC (i.e., non-directed
to confirm prior epistemic hypotheses).
In line with this latter idea are two recent papers showing that
non-specific motivations (i.e., rewards, mastery approach
goals, and performance approach goals) influence the
cognitive processes underlying the RIF on neutral stimuli.
More specifically, rewards (i.e., apple juice during retrieval-
practice), and mastery approach goals (i.e., developing one’s
own skills) eliminate RIF, while performance approach goals
(i.e., performing better than others) promote RIF (Imai et al.,
2014; Ikeda et al., 2015). The lack of RIF under (1) reward
and (2) mastery approach goals is due to the fact that these
motivations promote connections (and thus integration and
spreading of activation) among the items within a category.
In this way, competition is reduced, and thus the inhibition of
the Rp− materials is unnecessary for protecting the selective
retrieval of Rp+ items. Yet, it is possible that when competition
between neutral memories is too strong to be reduced, or
the connections between them are too durable, the effects
of motivation disappear (if the motivational force is not
enough strong to overcome them); in these cases, the cognitive
mechanisms are the only cause of RIF. Future research may
shed light on this hypothesis. All in all, however, we believe that
cognitive mechanisms generally interact with and/or respond to
motivational (conscious and unconscious) forces whenever the
person finds the opportunity and elements that serve attainment
of desired (specific and non-specific) conclusions.
In conclusion, the role of motivation in memory retrieval
effects appears to have important implications for the real social
world. For instance, as we have seen so far, motivation can distort
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2030
fpsyg-09-02030 October 19, 2018 Time: 18:25 # 5
Pica et al. RIF as Motivated Cognition
memories, and thus possibly also the subsequent evaluations
of other persons, brands, and events from the past. In line
with this idea, in our studies we investigated the effect of NFC
on RIF in various domains (e.g., brand memory, eyewitness
memory, and social cognition). Future studies should explore the
generalizability of our hypotheses in other contexts where RIF has
been proven to have implications (e.g., autobiographical memory,
learning, education, and creative thinking; for a review of the
applicability of RIF, see Storm et al., 2015). Therefore, during
interrogations of eyewitnesses, in education at school, or simply
when remembering one’s past experience or another person’s
features, people who remember or professionals who induce
retrieval must be aware that motivation may have detrimental
effects on memory.
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